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Abstract
The work described in this paper has as its goal
the integration of a number of reasoning
techniques into a unified intelligent information
system that will aid flight crews with malfunc-
tion diagnosis and prognostication. One of these
approaches involves using the extensive archive
of information contained in aircraft accident
reports along with various models of the air-
craft as the basis for case-based reasoning
about malfunctions.
Case-based reasoning draws conclusions on the
basis of similarities between the present situ-
ation and prior experience. We maintain that
the ability of a CBR program to reason about
physical systems is significantly enchanced by
the addition to the CBR program of various
models. This paper describes the diagnostic
concepts implemented in a prototypical case-
based reasoner that operates in the domain of
in-flight fault diagnosis, the various models
used in conjuction with the reasoner's CBR
component, and results from a preliminary
evaluation.
Introduction
Reasoning about physical systems is a difficult
process, and any attempt to automate this proc-
ess must overcome a number of challenges.
Among these are the tasks of generating expla-
nations of normal behavior, fault diagnoses, ex-
planations of the various manifestations of faults,
prediction of future behavior, etc. The reasoning
process becomes even more difficult when
physical systems must remain in operation. Dur-
ing operation, a physical system changes dy-
namically by modifying its set of components,
the components' states and pattern of intercon-
nections, and the system's behavior.
To address these concerns a prototypical case-
based reasoner (CBR), called Epaion, has been
developed by the Intelligent Cockpit Aids Team
at NASA Langley Research Center, in connec-
tion with ongoing work on AI-based systems for
in-flight fault management [Schutte et al.]. The
reasoner operates in the domain of in-flight fault
diagnosis and prognosis of aviation subsystems,
particularly jet engines. Automation of in-flight
fault diagnosis and prognosis can be used as an
aid to the flight crew for early detection of a
problem or failure. This provides the crew with
more time to respond more effectively and re-
duce potential damage due to the failure.
Several aspects of the aircraft domain make
automation of in-flight diagnosis challenging. In
contrast with non-operative diagnosis (i.e., diag-
nosis of systems that can be shut down), symp-
toms in aircraft subsystems may change with
time because of failure propagation. Information
about the operational status of many aircraft
components may be unavailable or incomplete
due to limited instrumentation, and safety and
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comfort considerationsplacefurther constraints
on in-flight testing.
The approachwe are taking employsa novel
methodologyfor dealingwith physicalsystemsin
operation, and involves the use of case-
basedtechniquesin conjunctionwith modelsthat
describethe physicalsystem. Case-BasedRea-
soningsystemssolve new problemsbyfinding
solvedproblemssimilar to the currentproblem
andadaptingtheir solutionsto thecurrentprob-
lem, taking into considerationany differences
betweenthe currentandpreviouslysolvedsitu-
ations.BecauseCBR systemsassociatefeatures
of a problemwith apreviouslyderivedsolution
to that problem,they are classifiedasassocia-
tional reasoningsystems.
We maintainthat the ability of a CBR program
to reasonaboutphysicalsystemscanbe signifi-
cantly enchancedby the addition of various
models to the CBR program. This paper de-
scribesthe diagnosticconceptsimplementedin
Epaion!, the variousmodelsusedin conjuction
with the CBR component,and results from
Epaion's preliminaryevaluation.Although the
examplespresentedpertain to aircraft malfunc-
tions, it is clear that these techniques are
applicableto spacecraftaswell.
Knowledge Sources
Epaion draws its power from several knowledge
sources, including a library of aircraft acci-
dent/incidents; a functional dependency model
with deep domain information about the func-
tional dependencies between the components of
the aircraft; and a model representing causal
information concerning transitions between vari-
ous states of the aircraft.
Case Library
Epaion maintains a library of actual aircraft acci-
dent/incident scenarios called cases. Each case
consists of a set of features that identify the
particular scenario, a list of the relevant context
variables and their particular status, a set of ob-
servable symptoms, the fault, and a causal expla-
nation that connects the observable symptoms to
a justifying cause. The set of identifying features
includes information such as aircraft type, airline,
flight number, date of the accident, and similar
data. The list of context variables includes in-
formation such as the phase of flight, the
weather, etc. The set of symptoms includes
information about abnormal observations
from mechanical sensors such as the value of
the exhaust gas temperature, the value of engine
pressure ratio, or from "human sensors," such as
the sound of an explosion, or the smell of smoke
in the passenger cabin. Cases containing all of
this information are called library cases, whereas
cases where the fault and the causal explanation
are not available are called input cases.
In contrast to most other CBR research efforts,
each case in our methodology consists not only
of a set of previously observed symptoms, but
also represents sequences of events over certain
time intervals. The time intervals may have un-
known and unequal lengths; it is the event order-
ing that is of importance. Such temporal in-
formation is necessary when reasoning about
operating physical systems, since the set of
symptoms observed at a particular time may rep-
resent improvement or deterioration from a pre-
vious reading, or may reveal valuable fault
propagation information. In a jet engine, for
example, the fact that the fan rotational speed
was observed to be abnormal prior to an abnor-
mal observation of the compressor rotational
speed is indicative that the faulty component is
the fan and that the fault propagated to the
compressor, rather than the reverse.
1 Ancient Greek for "expert"
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Causality Model
Epaion's causality model contains information
such as "fan-blade separation causes the rota-
tional speed of the fan to fluctuate" and "the
rotational speed of the fan causes the engine
pressure ratio to fluctuate." Along with the
causal information between two states, e.g.
"inefficient air flow" and "slowing down of the
engine", the model maintains a frequency count
of the number of times that the system witnessed
that inefficient air flow caused the engine to slow
down.
Functional Dependency Model
The functional dependency model is a digraph
model of an aircraft system, with nodes repre-
senting primitive components, and arrows con-
necting nodes representing functional depend-
encies. Component B is said to be functionally
dependent on component A if the proper func-
tioning of B depends on the proper functioning
of A. For example, the control surfaces of an
aircraft are functionally dependent on the hy-
draulic system, since they will cease operating if
the latter fails. The functional dependency
model contains two kind of arrows, representing
immediate and non-immediate links between
components. Two components C 1 and C2 are
connected via an immediate link 0-1ink) when
Cl'S failure propagates immediately to C 2, i.e.,
abnormal function of C 1 at time t 1 results in ab-
normal function of C 2 at time t 2 and t 1 = t2. If t2
>t 1 then C 1 is said to be connected to C 2 via an
non-immediate link (N-link). For example, if the
fan belt in an automotive engine breaks, the fault
propagates immediately to the electrical system,
as indicated by the generator light, but it may
take some time before the propagation to the
cooling system becomes evident from the tem-
perature sensor.
Physical Dependency Model
The physical dependency model is a digraph of
an aircraft system, similar to the functional de-
pendencies diagraph, in which the links in the
graph represent potential paths of fault propaga-
tion due to physical proximity. This sort of
propagation occurs when uncontrolled dis-
charges of energy attendant on component mal-
functions propagate to neighboring systems. The
severing of nearby hydraulic lines by blade frag-
ments from a disintegrating turbine provides a
typical example.
The Abstraction Hierarchy
The Case-Based Reasoning component of
Epaion consists of a self-organizing memory
structured as a frame-based abstraction hierar-
chy, as defined by [Schank 1982]. This memory
forms an upper bounded semi-lattice that
contains domain specific information at different
levels of abstraction. The information contained
in the lattice includes:
a. The names of all components in an aircraft
engine.
b. The components that are sensors. The exhaust
gas temperature, the rotational speed of the fan,
and the fuel flow indicator are some of the me-
chanical sensors in an aircraft's engine. Vision,
sight, and smell are the "human sensors" used in
the diagnostic process.
c. The possible values for each sensor. For a
mechanical sensor the allowable values are:
lower than expected; normal; higher than ex-
pected. If a sensor initially indicates values that
are normal, then at the following time interval
indicates values that are lower than expected,
and at the third time interval still indicates values
which are lower than expected, then the status of
the sensor during these three time intervals is
normal, lower, lower which is a kind (i.e.,
subcategory) of overall lower than expected
status which in turn is a kind of abnormal status.
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d. Thevariousfaults that maybeobservedin an
enginesubsystem.For example,it is represented
thatseagull ingestion is a kind of bird ingestion
fault which is a kind of foreign object ingestion
fault and so on.
e. Information on how faults manifest them-
selves. For example, fan vibration and ab-
normality in the rotational speed of the fan are
manifestations of a problem in the fan.
f. The accident/incidents that the system already
knows. For example the system knows that the
incident of a China Airlines Boeing 747 that
suffered a mishap over the Pacific Ocean_ on
February 19, 1985 [NTSB-AAR-86-03] is an
instance of an accident/incident since it is a kind
of rotor related scenario which is a kind of
engine related scenario which is a kind of acci-
dent incident scenario.
Reasoning Cycle
Epaion's reasoning cycle consists of the follow-
ing three phases: input a new problem; retrieve
the most similar case; adapt the retrieved case to
fit the current scenario.
Epaion's input constitutes a set of symptoms ex-
perienced by an airplane's crew during a flight.
When the system experiences a new set of
symptoms, i.e., when faced with an input (new)
case, it searches its case library for the
most similar case. This is done by placing the
input case in self-organizing MOP 2 memory un-
der the most appropriate parents, determined as
described in [Riesbeck & Schank 1989]. The
siblings may therefore be assumed to be closely
related. The nearest sibling is retrieved as the
case that is most similar to the input case.
When the system finds and retrieves a similar
case, Epaion assumes that the current fault is the
2 Memory Organization Packet
same as the fault in the retrieved case and adapts
the causal explanation of the retrieved case to fit
the current case. The fault and the causal expla-
nation are both stored in the case library for
future usage. The system is provided with a set
of adaptation rules which, in addition to adapting
the retrieved causal explanation to fit the current
case, find possible gaps in the causal explanation
and fill in the missing causalities by using the
models. This causal explanation connects the
symptoms to a justifying cause, and thus the
system's multiple-model-based causal reasoning
ability produces a causal analysis of the new
case, rather than simply a reference to a previous
solution. The new causal analysis is not
only stored in the case library as part of the input
case, but is used to augment and modify the
knowledge of the causal model. The following
section provides details of this process.
Adaptation and the Models
Epaion's adaptation algorithm is summarized in
the following two steps:
The first step involves the transfer of the fault
from the library case in the input case and con-
sists of two possibilities.
Case 1: If the match between the input case and
the library case exceeds a threshold value then
the fault is transferred intact. For example, if in
the library case the fault was a malfunctioning
fuel controller, then it is assumed to be the same
in the input case.
Case 2: If the match is below the threshold value
then an abstraction of the library case fault is
transferred to the input case. For example, if in
the library case the fault was bird ingestion, then
it is assumed that in the input case the fault is
foreign object ingestion.
The second step involves the adaptation of the
causal explanation of the library case so it can
explain each, or as many as possible, of the
86
symptomsof the input scenarioby connecting
themto a justifying cause.This consistsof the
followingpossibilities:
Case 1: If the library caseand the input case
haveidentical symptomsthen the causalexpla-
nationof the library caseis transferredintact to
the inputcase.
Case2: If the inputcasecontainssymptomsthat
do not appearin the library casethenthecausal
explanationof the library caseis transferredin
the input caseandthe following additionalproc-
essingtakes place. Let 02 be an unexplained
inputcasesymptom.
Subcase 1" If the causal model containsthe
relation 01 causes 02, and 01 is a symptom or
manifestation in the input case, then the link 01
causes 02 is added in the causal explanation of the
input case.
Subcase 2: The causal portion of the model
does not contain the relation 01 causes 02, but the
functional dependency model knows that com-
ponent C2 is functionally dependent on compo-
nent C 1, and 01 is a manifestation of abnormal
behavior of component C 1, and similarly 02 is a
manifestation of C 2. This knowledge is depicted
by the graph
C1 C2
where 0 denotes a phenomenon that is a symp-
tom or manifestation l.t of abnormal behavior of a
component. Additionally, if 01 is a symptom in
the input case and time(_l) < time(C2), i.e.,
symptom 01 appeared before or concurrent with
02 then the link 01 causes 02 is added in the causal
explanation of the input case.
At present, Epaion is implemented to diagnose
faults in the engine subsystem of a generic twin
engine transport. The programs currently run on
various platforms using Common Lisp. Figure 1
displays the use of the various models during the
adaptation process.
Unexplained Symptoms
i
i
Remaining Symptoms
i
I
Remaining Symptoms
,,:.:.::i:i:i:i:i:!:_;iiiii:iiiiiiii_iii_iii_ i_ i; i_i[_iiii:i_i:i:ili_ili::::i::.:',:i:_:::_::::::,
Figure 1: Use of models during adaptation
Simulation and the Physical Model
We have indicated that Epaoin uses a physical
dependency digraph as one of its models. This is
a makeshift measure, however, due to the fact
that physical fault propagation, being the result
of catastrophic component failures, is highly
unpredictable. One expedient for dealing with
this unpredicatability is to refer to previous
cases, as Epaion does; another is to utilize spa-
tial simulation models (SSMs) to determine the
effect of uncontrolled energy releases. [Feyock
& Li, 1990, 1992] describe the use of SSMs to
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predict both fluidic and energy leaks 3. These
models, which are easily interfaced with host
systems, require only the identity of the faulty
component, which can be supplied by Epaion.
The SSM then looks in the component database
to determine the location and type of the com-
ponent. If the component is of a type that can
cause a fluid or energy leak, the system uses this
information to set the initial conditions for the
simulation. The simulation is then run, and the
physical propagation paths predicted by the SSM
are extracted from the run data.
In addition to addressing the chaotic nature of
physical propagation, our use of simulation
models in conjunction with more traditional rea-
soning systems is prompted by a belief that
deriving answers to real-world questions by
setting up the initial conditions of simulation
models, running the simulations, and extracting
information from the results of the run, consti-
tutes a powerful but underutilized mode of op-
eration for AI systems.
Results
We conducted an experimental evaluation of
Epaion on actual aircraft accident/incident cases
involving engine faults. Information provided in
the individual accident/incident reports from the
National Transportation Board (NTSB), the
British Air Accidents Investigation Branch
(AAIB), and data collected from test accidents
staged at Boeing Inc. [Shontz et. al. 1992] was
used to derive the appropriate information con-
stituting each case, a process called accident
reconstruction. We reconstructed a total of
eighteen cases, of which sixteen were used as
library cases, and six as input cases.
The evaluation process required that each input
case be presented to Epaion separately, and that
3 We denote as "energy leaks" the catastrophic
disintegration of_omponefits due to the uncontrolled
release of kinetic or potential energy.
the system produce a diagnosis along with a
causal explanation. The diagnosis produced by
Epaion was then compared with the correct
diagnosis for the particular scenario. In addition,
the reasoner was evaluated based on the number
of symptoms for which the reasoner was able to
find a justification. A "correct diagnosis" is the
diagnosis determined by NTSB, AAIB, or by
[Shontz et. al. 1992]. Epaion is said to have
produced a complete explanation if the system
was able to explain each observed symptom by
connecting the symptom to a justifying cause.
The results achieved are very promising for the
future success of the system. Based on the re-
suits we make the following observations.
• Classification
Five of the six cases in this evaluation were
correctly classified. A case involving water in-
gestion [NTSB-AAR-78-3] was classified under
the category of miscellaneous scenarios due to
the lack of previously encountered water inges-
tion scenarios. An, expanded case library will
enhance the systems classification capability and
therefore offer better matches for each additional
input case.
• Diagnosis
Epaion was able to correctly diagnose five of the
six scenarios. A case representing the American
Airlines Flight 566 scenario [NTSB-F-A067]
was properly classified as rotor scenario but
misdiagnosed as fan problem rather than turbine
problem. This is a result of the fact that prob-
lems in the fan and problems in the turbine
manifest themselves similarly, and therefore both
kinds of faults are classified under the category
of rotor scenarios. When the American Airlines
scenario was used as input case the system re-
trieved as the most similar case a Dan Air
incident [AAI-AAR-4/90], which is a fan blade
scenario. With almost negligible difference in the
degree of match between the input case and the
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relevantlibrarycases,the secondbestmatchwas
the accidentof the United Airlines Flight 611
that took placeon July 19, 1970[NTSB-AAR-
72-9].This is a turbinefault scenarioandwould
haveachieveda higherdegreeof similaritywith
the input caseif the time orderof the symptoms
in both caseshad beenrepresentedmore pre-
cisely.All symptomsusedin reconstructingthe
caseof the United Airlines Flight 6II were
based on expert opinion, but none were
explicitly stated in the NTSB report. With the
exception of the behavior of the EGT, the same
holds for the symptoms used to reconstruct the
American Airlines Flight 566 scenario. This
suggests that presenting the system with cases
that are reconstructed based on an accurate set
of symptoms is vital for correct matching and
therefore correct diagnoses.
• Symptom explanation
In five of the cases presented as input Epaion
was able to explain all of the symptoms experi-
enced. When Epaion was presented with the
symptoms of an icing scenario staged at Boeing
[Shontz et. al. 1992] it failed to explain the pres-
ence of broad-band vibration. The failure is at-
tributable to insufficient information in the ab-
straction hierarchy. If the fact that broad-band
vibration is a manifestation of fan abnormality
had been included in the abstraction hierarchy,
the system's functional dependencies model
would have explained the broad-band vibration
symptom as a result of fan blade damage. The
same result would have been achieved if the
system had previously experienced other cases
with broad-band vibration, thus enabling the
causal model to explain the vibration. It is
evident that the more knowledge the system
contains in its abstraction hierarchy, the better its
explanation capability will be. Current efforts are
accordingly focused on expanding this
knowledge to a substantial size.
Conclusion
Automation of inflight diagnosis and prognosis
as an aid to the flight crew has great potential for
improving the general safety of civil transport
operations. The Epaion Case-Based Reasoning
system we have developed for the purpose of
performing fault diagnosis and prognosis of
aircraft in operation uses a hybrid
reasoning process based on a library of previous
cases and several types of models of the aircraft
as the basis for the reasoning process.
This arrangement provides the methodology
with the flexibility and power of ftrst-principle
reasoners, coupled with the speed of associa-
tional systems.
A major concern of this project has been to
create a system capable of achieving a practically
useful level of performance on a case base of
significant size, thereby avoiding the "toy prob-
lem" trap besetting many AI systems. The ex-
tensive use of a classification hierarchy allows
the system to achieve O(log n) search times,
while the information abstraction attendant with
accident reconstruction produces space-efficient
representations. The system is currently hosted
on a desktop personal computer, and is esti-
mated to be capable of storing the full set of
propulsion related aircraft accident for the last
20 years. These considerations, together with the
encouraging level of success achieved by
Epaion, support the expectation that this system
will prove to be an effective contributor to air-
craft safety.
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